Paradoxical Language in Chan Buddhism by Ho, Chien-Hsing
1 
Chien-hsing Ho 
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, Taiwan 
Email: hochg@sinica.edu.tw 
 
21. Paradoxical Language in Chan Buddhism 
Chien-hsing Ho 
I. 
Chinese Chan or Zen Buddhism is renowned for its improvisational, atypical, and 
perplexing use of words. In particular, the tradition’s encounter dialogues, which took 
place between Chan masters and their interlocutors and are recorded in its koan (“public 
case”) literature, abound in puzzling, astonishing, and paradoxical ways of speaking. In 
this chapter, we are concerned with Chan’s use of paradoxical language. In 
philosophical parlance, a linguistic paradox comprises the confluence of opposite or 
incongruent concepts in a way that runs counter to our common sense and ordinary 
rational thinking.1 One naturally wonders about Chan masters’ rationales for their use 
of paradox. There are also concerns about whether the use violates the logical law of 
noncontradiction to the effect that nothing can be both P and not-P all over in the same 
way at the same time. 
Recently, Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield, and Graham Priest have argued that certain 
Mahayana Buddhists are committed to the view that some contradictions are true, and 
that modern developments in paraconsistent logics show that such a view can be 
rational and acceptable.2 For example, some Buddhists describe certain things about 
an indescribable reality such that the indescribable is described. The reality is both 
                                                     
1 There are at least two kinds of paradox: logical paradox and linguistic paradox. To see the contrast, 
Russell’s paradox regarding Cantor’s set theory is a logical paradox: the set of all sets that are not 
members of themselves contains itself as a member. In this chapter, we are solely concerned with 
linguistic paradox; also, in my usage, the paradoxical is not to be identified with the contradictory. 
2 These authors themselves endorse the philosophical position known as dialetheism, which holds that 
the law of noncontradiction fails, that some contradictions are true. For discussions on the law and the 
position, see Priest, Beall, and Armour-Garb 2004. 
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describable and not describable – a contradiction. On the view of these authors, the 
Buddhists take such contradictory statements to be true, which they say is rationally 
coherent and intelligible.3 
However, Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest focus mainly on Indian Madhyamaka and 
Japanese Zen. It is doubtful that Chinese Chan masters and thinkers would affirm the 
truth of contradictory statements. In the Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch, Huineng 
惠能 (638−713 CE), the putative sixth patriarch of Chan Buddhism, is reported as 
saying that some people “slander [scriptural] teachings and say they make no use of 
words. As they say so, they should not even speak, for speech is a form of words.”4 It 
is implied that the claim that one makes no use of words is self-contradictory and should 
not have been made in the first place. Nevertheless, this sutra’s teaching of no-thought 
(wunian 無念) instructs one, paradoxically, to have no thought while engaged in 
thought. One would be both thinking and not thinking. We need to clarify this issue. 
In any case, I intend in this chapter to investigate Chan masters’ rationales for their 
use of paradox. My aim is also to show that Chan’s paradoxical expressions are only 
seemingly contradictory and do not really violate the law of noncontradiction. 
Chan became a viable Chinese Buddhist tradition during the Tang dynasty (618−907) 
and continued to develop for several centuries. The tradition produced a huge literature; 
consequently, our investigation of its use of paradox cannot but be limited and selective. 
It is now widely recognized among scholars of Chan studies that baffling encounter 
dialogues that appear in the sayings of Tang Chan masters are generally interpolations 
                                                     
3 Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest 2008: 399-401. For further related discussions, see Priest 2002 and Priest 
2014. For Priest, the nature of reality is contradictory in the sense that it is such as to render certain 
contradictory statements true. 
4 Yang 2001: 64. For this sutra, I rely chiefly on Yang 2001, which contains a well-collated text of a 
Dunhuang version that may date about 780 CE. In this chapter, all translations from traditional Chinese 
texts are mine. 
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made in the post-Tang era, whereas the masters’ own sermons are more reasonable and 
bear more affinity with Mahayana scriptural teachings than the dialogues do. Thus, we 
need to distinguish the sermons from encounter dialogues. In the next (second) section, 
I first sketch key ideas of Chan that are pertinent to our investigation and then examine 
the use of paradox in the sermons associated with certain Tang masters of the Southern 
Chan.5 In the third section, I analyze the presence of paradoxical language in post-Tang 
encounter dialogues. The fourth section concludes. 
 
II. 
For Chan, the purpose of religious training is to realize or awaken to one’s original mind 
(benxin 本心) or buddha-nature in order to free oneself from the samsaric cycle of life 
and death. I understand the notion of original mind as referring to our mind-heart in its 
limpid, nonabiding (wuzhu 無住), and unfettered state. In a sense we already live in 
original mind, though, being clouded by mental afflictions and habitual sedimentations 
of dualistic thinking, it is not consciously manifest to us. From the Chan perspective, 
original mind is all-inclusive and all-pervasive, just like empty space (xukong 虛空). 
As the pivotal experience of awakening is that of the mind being realized and becoming 
manifest, one would here experience a dynamic coalescing of one’s mind and the 
myriad objects, which in the Platform Sūtra is compared to a great sea that merges the 
waters of various streams into a whole. The subject-object duality is transcended and 
the awakened Chan practitioner may declare that the myriad things are present in their 
(original) mind. 
                                                     
5 A number of contemporary scholars have questioned the traditional opposition between “Northern 
School’s gradual awakening” and “Southern School’s sudden awakening.” Yet, I shall not concern 
myself with this issue here. By “Southern Chan” I mean the lineages that were traditionally seen as 
belonging to the Southern School of Chan. 
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Since original mind is nonabiding, to realize it, an unawakened mind should learn to 
flow freely with the changes of thoughts and things without abiding in them or attaching 
itself thereto. Nonabidingness and nonattachment are valued highly in Chan, but care 
is needed here. One must not abide in, or attach oneself to, nonabidingness or 
nonattachment either. Significantly, for Chan, the myriad things are ever changing and 
devoid of any independent and substantial nature. They are then said to be empty. This, 
together with the above hinted nondual perspective, indicates that things are devoid of 
determinate natures and forms (xiang 相), intimately interrelated, and are not really 
distinct from each other. Thus, for instance, we must not see mountains definitively as 
mountains nor waters definitively as waters, and so forth.6 To cognize X definitively 
as X is to impose on it a fixed, determinate identity, which differentiates intrinsically X 
from non-X things and easily results in attachment to it. 
Meanwhile, language provides us with an all-important access to the world around 
us and to other people, and Chan’s attitude toward language is not as negative as 
scholars used to think. However, the use of nominal words tends to seduce one into 
reifying their referents, taking the latter to be substantial and distinctly demarcated 
entities, which may induce an attitude of attachment toward the referents. To note a way 
of countering this tendency, we may attend to the famous paradoxical formula in the 
Diamond Sūtra to the effect that what is said to be X is not X, and so is called X. This 
sutra is highly influential in Chan and the formula presumably leads the Chan master 
Baizhang Huaihai百丈懷海 (749−814) to claim that a teaching speech in Buddhism 
consists of three conjoined phrases such as “a bodhisattva, is not a bodhisattva, so is 
                                                     
6 I am alluding to the celebrated Chan koan of seeing mountains as mountains; refer to footnote 28 for a 
related remark. See also the Essentials of the Transmission of Mind, in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 
(abbreviated as T) 48: 381a15-18 (volume 48, page 381, column a, line 15-18), and the Discourse 
Records of Dazhu and Visiting Students from All Quarters, in Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 
(abbreviated as X) 63: 25a23-b3. 
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called a bodhisattva” (henceforth, T1) and “dharma, not dharma, not not-dharma” (T2).7 
The formula of the Diamond Sūtra appears to state that something is both X and not-
X at the same time.8 Likewise, if we treat the term “bodhisattva” in T1 as a predicate, 
T1 would seem to involve the following logical form, which is a contradiction: 
 
(1a) (y)[(y is bodhisattva)(y is not bodhisattva)] 
which is equivalent to: 
(1b) (y)(ByBy) 
 
Yet, in light of Baizhang’s related explication and Chan teaching in general, the 
formula can be unpacked as follows: that which is designated by the word “X” (which 
can be any nominal word) is not a determinate and substantial X, not definitively an X, 
and ought not be an object of attachment; if this is recognized, one can use “X” 
provisionally to refer to the designated item as X. Thus construed, the formula, far from 
implying any contradiction, nicely helps to eschew attachment to the word’s referent 
while indicating the provisionality of the use of the word. Similarly, Baizhang’s second 
phrase in T1 (“is not a bodhisattva”) helps to eschew attachment to the referent of the 
first phrase (“a bodhisattva”) as well as to empty the referent of determinacy and 
substantiality. Although other Chan masters may not employ the formula in its complete 
form, many negative expressions in Chan texts serve functions similar to that of the 
                                                     
7 Comprehensive Recorded Sayings of Master Baizhang, X 68: 8a10-12. Baizhang’s explication, in X 68: 
8a13-15, of the claim indicates that what is negated by the negative particle not is attachment to the 
referent of the negated phrase and any understanding that takes the referent to be definitively so and 
so. 
8 In the beginning of their aforementioned paper, Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest (2008: 395-396) give a 
list of nine passages from Buddhist texts that they think contain contradictions. Three of the passages 
are cited from the Diamond Sūtra and concern the application of the formula. 
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second phrase. 
Baizhang’s third phrase in T2 (“not not-dharma”) can be construed as signifying the 
negation of a negation. The point is that one must not attach oneself to the negation 
expressed by the second phrase (“not dharma”) nor take the latter to signify complete 
absence of the item negated by it. Now, the second and third phrases in T2 together 
represent a double negation of the form “neither X nor not-X,” which negates both 
attachment to X and attachment to the negation of X. Yet, it may be converted to the 
seemingly contradictory form “non-X and not non-X” or “X and not X.” Consider, for 
instance, the sentence “The Buddha is neither sacred nor profane.” Here, “the Buddha” 
denotes an individual (say, “b”). If we view “neither sacred” as equivalent to “non-
sacred,” and then to “profane” (designated by “P”), we seem to be able to derive the 
following logical form, which is a contradiction: 
 
(2a) [(b is P)&(b is not P)] 
which is equivalent to: 
(2b) [Pb&Pb)] 
 
However, for Baizhang, to speak of the Buddha as neither sacred nor profane is not 
to affirm that the Buddha is non-sacred or non-profane. That is to say, the negation “not” 
in the sentence S, “x is not-P,” negates any substantial relation between x and P without 
predicating of x any property (say, non-P); S does not commit its utterer to accepting 
that x has any property.9 Consequently, the double negation “neither X nor not-X,” as 
                                                     
9 Comprehensive Recorded Sayings of Master Baizhang, X 68: 8a15-16: “… the Buddha is just neither 
sacred nor profane. Do not wrongly say he is non-sacred and non-profane.” We here allude to the 
distinction between two kinds of negation drawn by Indian and Chinese Mādhyamika thinkers. The 
negation in S is nonimplicative negation. By contrast, if the negation in S is implicative negation, then, 
while denying P of x, S also implies the affirmation of some other property of x such that S commits 
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implied in Baizhang’s conjoined phrases, would not for him entail any contradiction. 
Likewise, contrary to appearances, we cannot derive (2a) or (2b) from the sentence 
“The Buddha is neither sacred nor profane.” 
Indeed, even the sentence “x is P and not-P” would not be contradictory if the word 
“P” is ambiguous, or is used provisionally such that “x is P” connotes that x is not non-
P.10 Chan expressions are typically provisional in the sense that they do not predicate 
of their referents determinate properties, but are used expediently for immediate 
purposes and are to be negated especially when one becomes attached to their referents 
or takes the latter to be definitively such and such. In particular, the parity between T1 
and T2 suggests that, for Baizhang, even when the third phrase is stated in an affirmative 
way (as in T1), the affirmation expressed may actually be a provisional affirmation that 
should be construed as the negation of a negation (as in T2). In this vein, “is P” in the 
sentence “x is P and not-P” would not predicate the property P of x, but rather express 
the negation of the negation of P, namely, not not-P (or, not non-P). As a result, the 
sentence would not imply the contradiction that P belongs and does not belong at the 
same time to x. 
Moreover, for Chan, Buddhist teachings are, like medicines, remedial in nature. 
Language is used not so much for its cognitive function of expressing factual 
descriptions of the world as for its noncognitive function of fulfilling therapeutic, 
heuristic and evocative purposes. For example, as Baizhang comments, a Buddhist 
                                                     
its utterer to acceptance of that property in x. 
10 The Chinese Mādhyamika thinker Sengzhao (374?−414 CE) is quite influential in Chan. On his view, 
the provisional use of the word “existent” with respect to the thing x is intended to show that x is not 
nonexistent, whereas that of the word “nonexistent” is to show that x is not existent. The words function 
by negatively differentiating x from what x is not, rather than positively characterizing x as definitively 
existent or nonexistent. See the Treatise of Sengzhao, T 45: 152c12-14, 159b11. Although Chan masters 
may not have stated similar ideas explicitly, their recognition of the provisionality of language may 
well point in the same direction. See also the following remark on Baizhang. 
Forthcoming in Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic, Springer, 2019. 
 
8 
 
teacher may sometimes teach that “There is Buddha,” some other times that “There is 
no Buddha,” depending on the audience’s intellectual illness.11 The teacher may teach 
“There is Buddha” in order to remove the audience’s doubt about the existence of 
buddha-nature, but may teach “There is no Buddha” to quell one’s attachment to 
buddha-nature. What matters is the effectiveness of the teachings in achieving their 
purposes, but not their truth, concerning which alone the issue of contradiction occurs. 
Given the above discussion, we can now look at a few instances of paradox in Tang 
dynasty Chan. Let us attend to the Platform Sūtra teaching of no-thought first. Clearly, 
this sutra opposes the extinction of thought. It states that the purpose of the negation 
implied in the term “no-thought” is to negate one’s attachment to the objects of thought 
and free oneself from afflictions that arise from dualistic ideas. It is suggested that one 
whose thought arises directly from original mind, presumably one who has awakened 
to the mind, knows best how to think without attachment to the objects.12 Then, the 
word “thought” in the aforementioned “to have no thought while engaged in thought” 
is ambiguous: its first occurrence signifies a thought of attachment while the second 
occurrence does not. Since the word is used in two different senses, there is no 
contradiction to the effect that one is thinking and not thinking in the same respect at 
the same time. 
Some of the paradoxical expressions in Tang Chan are not unusual in Chinese 
Buddhism. For example, the Chan master Shenhui 神會  (684−758) claims that 
wisdom (Skt. prajñā 般若) does not know and yet knows everything, while Huangbo 
                                                     
11  For the provisionality of language and its remedial character, see the Comprehensive Recorded 
Sayings of Master Baizhang, X 68: 7c21-24, 12c14-19, and the Essentials of the Transmission of Mind, 
T 48: 382c27-383a02. Wang (2003: 179) writes: “For the Chan masters and students, if the therapeutic 
functions of these paradoxical expressions are effective, there are no contradictory meanings at all 
within the pragmatic context.” 
12 Yang 2001: 19-20, 37-38. See Ho 2016 for relevant discussion. 
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Xiyun 黃檗希運 (751?−850?) states that the Buddha speaks all day without having 
spoken.13 Both sayings may come from Sengzhao’s Treatise of Sengzhao and could be 
said to be rooted in certain Mahayana scriptures.14 
For Huangbo, original mind is all-inclusive, capable of pervading the myriad things, 
which are held to be empty. This results in a nondualistic ontology, in which the mind 
is nondual with the myriad things and there is no genuine hindrance or demarcation 
between the things. In consequence, the mind is nondual with language, which is among 
the things pervaded by it. Given that silence can be taken to symbolize the ineffable 
original mind, speech and silence are nondual as well.15 Thus, the Buddha’s speaking 
is not really distinct from his silence or not speaking. 
Herein, the paradoxicality of Huangbo’s statement is due not so much to the 
ambiguity of the words used as to Chan’s nondualistic ontology, in which are embedded 
the notions of original mind and emptiness. Although this may imply the nonduality of 
P (speaking) and not-P (not-speaking), this nonduality is not a strict or logical identity 
and so we cannot derive a contradiction from it. As a metaphorical illustration, consider 
the case of foam on the sea surface. The foam is not strictly identical with the sea water 
around, yet is existentially part of, and not distinct from, the water. The relation between 
                                                     
13 Yang 1996: 26 (Cf. Treatise on the Essential Gate of Entering the Way through Sudden Awakening, X 
63: 18b24-c4); Wanling Record of Chan Master Huangbo Duanji, X 68: 21c17-18. Shenhui does not 
give reasons for his claim. Probably, wisdom does not know because it does not know its object through 
a mind of attachment and dualistic discrimination; wisdom knows everything because it knows original 
mind, which comprises all things within itself. 
14  Treatise of Sengzhao, T 45: 153a27-29, 153c26. For a recent exposition of Sengzhao’s use of 
paradoxical expression, see Ho 2013. 
15 Wanling Record of Chan Master Huangbo Duanji, X 68: 21c13-14: “Speech is silence, silence is 
speech, so speech and silence are nondual.” Since, in Chan Buddhism, original mind is generally taken 
to be ineffable, the question arises as to whether Chan thinkers fall into the contradiction of describing 
the indescribable. I have, in Ho 2015, attempted to show how one can express the ineffable without 
contradiction. Then, this issue may not pose a serious problem to Chan. 
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speech and original mind (or the fusional unity of myriad objects and the mind) may be 
understood by analogy with the foam and sea water. In any case, Huangbo’s statement 
that the Buddha speaks all day without having spoken is not contradictory. 
Similarly, appealing to the all-inclusiveness of original mind and the emptiness of all 
things as a basis, Huangbo claims, paradoxically, that life-and-death and nirvana are 
not distinct but form a unity.16 Indeed, because he appears to identify nirvana with 
original mind, Huangbo can readily take nirvana to be nondual with life-and-death 
while being aware of their differences in certain respects. Incidentally, within this 
conceptual framework, the best practice for a Chan practitioner would paradoxically be 
to practice nothing. Or, as Huangbo makes clear, the practitioner simply needs to learn 
how not to seek for, and attach oneself to, anything. As noted above, the goal of Chan 
training is to realize or awaken to one’s original mind. Since we already live in the mind, 
to seek for, and so objectify, it would only counteract its realization; similarly, to attach 
oneself to the myriad objects would only cloud its manifestation. When one truly 
refrains from seeking for, and attaching oneself to, original mind and the myriad objects, 
then and only then may one become awakened to the mind. 
Often, Chan’s paradoxical expression resembles the combination of Baizhang’s first 
two phrases (as “A Bodhisattva is not a Bodhisattva”) and is intended to quell the 
audience’s attachment to the linguistic referent and indicate the latter’s emptiness, 
indeterminacy, or illusoriness. For example, Huangbo teaches that “mind is not mind,” 
“form is not form,” “existence is not existence,” “dharma is non-dharma, non-dharma 
                                                     
16 Essentials of the Transmission of Mind, T 48: 381a2-29; Wanling Record of Chan Master Huangbo 
Duanji, X 68: 20b1-8. Recall that a linguistic paradox comprises the confluence of incongruent 
concepts. Since “life-and-death” and “nirvana” are incongruent concepts, we have a paradoxical 
expression here. Incidentally, the equation of life-and-death with nirvana is a recurrent theme in Chan 
and Chinese Buddhism. 
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is dharma,” and so forth.17 These expressions are uttered to indicate that the referents 
of such words as “mind,” “form,” “existence,” and “dharma” are empty, illusory, and 
unobtainable. The audience is thereby advised that one must not be attached to any of 
them. 
Many paradoxical expressions in Chan sermons of Tang dynasty concern the notion 
of mind. Dazhu Huihai 大珠慧海, a pupil of the illustrious Chan master Mazu Daoyi 
馬祖道一 (709−788), affirms, quoting an unnamed patriarch, that only by realizing 
that mind is not mind can one truly understand mind and its various functions. Further, 
Huangbo instructs that “this mind is the mind of no-mind,” that “mind is itself mindless, 
and there is no mindless one either.”18 It would seem that one both has and does not 
have mind. 
The thrust here, I think, is that, for Chan, our mind is really void of any cognizable 
form and is ungraspable and unobtainable. In its true nature, the mind is none other than 
the all-inclusive original mind. Yet, we fail to cognize its true nature and tend to 
conceive of it as, say, an inner mental entity confined within the body. Such a 
conception is to be negated. Then, what is negated by Huangbo’s “no-mind” and 
“mindless” is this internally confined and seemingly identifiable mind, a mind that is 
constructed while in a state of delusion. As there should not be any attachment to the 
idea of no-mind, it is added that there is no mindless one either. Meanwhile, this 
emphasis on no-mind has a practical significance. As one empties one’s mind, not 
                                                     
17 Wanling Record of Chan Master Huangbo Duanji, X 68: 20a4-24. 
18 Discourse Records of Dazhu and Visiting Students from All Quarters, X 63: 29b18; Essentials of the 
Transmission of Mind, T 48: 380b1-2, b12-13. The notion of no-mind is a common theme in Chan 
Buddhism. The Treatise on No Mind (無心論), a Chan text probably composed in the Tang dynasty, 
states paradoxically that though one has no mind, one can very well see, hear, feel, and know, that 
genuine mind is none other than no-mind. The text makes it clear that we are said to have no mind 
because our mind is really formless and so unobtainable, and that what is negated by “no-mind” is the 
mind of delusive thought. See App 1995: 35-64. 
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treating it as something inwardly locatable, one may rather expand the mind outwards. 
This may help one to realize eventually what one’s mind really is, namely, the all-
inclusive original mind. 
The above discussions suggest that paradoxical expressions in Chan texts of Tang 
dynasty are not truly contradictory. Obviously, there are reasons for using such 
expressions. In the Chan context, their use may help to indicate the nonsubstantial and 
indeterminate nature of the referent of the word used and help one to refrain from 
attaching oneself to the referent. It also helps to show the provisional and remedial 
characters of language. In addition, their use flows naturally from Chan’s nondualistic 
ontology, in which are embedded the notions of original mind and emptiness. On the 
other hand, paradoxical language may serve the functions of dislodging the 
interlocutor’s habitual way of thinking and of evoking in them an experience of 
awakening. This is most likely the case in Chan’s encounter dialogues, to which we 
now turn. 
 
III. 
An encounter dialogue in Chan Buddhism takes place between a Chan master and an 
interlocutor (a pupil, a monk, or a layperson) or interlocutors.19 Such dialogues take 
many linguistic forms and may involve shouting, silence, gesture, and such physical 
acts as hitting and kicking. They are similar in that the master’s words (and gestures) 
typically transgress upon our commonly shared sense of things and dislodge the 
interlocutor’s expectation and habitual way of thinking. In most cases, the words are 
not strictly paradoxical. They are simply perplexing or, in many cases, seemingly 
                                                     
19 An encounter dialogue may occur between two Chan masters, especially when one master is assessing 
the other’s attainment of awakening, but I shall generally disregard this type of encounter dialogue. 
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irrelevant to the interlocutor’s question. 
For instance, a question most often asked in an encounter dialogue is, “What was the 
first patriarch’s intention in coming from the West?” To this question, Chan masters 
give, among others, these answers: “The cypress tree in the yard;” “To wash this old 
monk’s feet;” “To walk in the day and lay down at night;” “There is no intention in 
coming from the West;” “I’ll tell you once the stone turtle understands human speech.” 
The answers are puzzling, if not nonsensical. Meanwhile, to the question “Two dragons 
vie for a pearl, which one gains it?” Chan masters’ answers include: “Where is the 
pearl?;” “The gainer loses it;” “Gain is loss;” “The one with claws and teeth does not 
gain it;” “The pearl is everywhere on the ground but looks like mud to the eyes.” Some 
of the answers are indeed paradoxical, while some others are at most at variance with 
the background assumptions. Although our focus should be on paradoxical expressions, 
much of the following discussion applies to encounter dialogue in general. 
We begin with an illuminating encounter dialogue that was traditionally believed to 
take place between Bodhidharma (470?−543?) and Huike 慧可 (487−593), the first 
and second patriarchs of Chan Buddhism:20 
 
Huike: “I have no peace of my mind. Teacher, please pacify it for me.” 
Bodhidharma: “Bring forth your mind, and I will pacify it for you.” 
Huike: “I seek for it but the mind is unobtainable.” 
Bodhidharma: “There! I have pacified your mind.” 
 
                                                     
20 Jingde Record of the Transmission of the Lamp, T 51: 219b21-23. Given the popularity of this dialogue 
in post-Tang Chan Buddhism, even though it plausibly did not occur between the two patriarchs, we 
can reasonably regard it as an encounter dialogue, which may well have occurred between some Chan 
practitioners. For convenience sake, I write as if it took place between the patriarchs. 
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Notably, Huike’s reply to the effect that his mind is unobtainable does not show that he 
has realized the true nature of his mind and Bodhidharma would be pleased to give him 
his sanction. In the present context, it does not require a Chan-like awakening 
realization for one to take one’s mind to be unobtainable: after all, we are unable to 
bring forth our mind (or physical heart where the mind may be thought to be located) 
to someone else. What is really perplexing is that Bodhidharma then claims to have 
pacified Huike’s mind when he seems to have done nothing at all. He claims, somewhat 
paradoxically, to have pacified Huike’s unobtainable and so seemingly unpacifiable 
mind. 
In order to bring into relief Huike’s and Bodhidharma’s different understandings of 
the unobtainability of mind, let us consider these two statements:21 
 
(A)  This mind is unobtainable. 
(B)  This unobtainable is the mind. 
 
In his reply, Huike basically expresses statement (A), which can be simply a description 
of the empirical fact that one cannot bring forward one’s mind to others. However, it 
may be the case that Huike actually has a deeper understanding of his mind than merely 
grasping the fact; that is, he rightly cognizes that, in its true nature, the mind is formless 
and unobtainable. Even so, Huike does not truly realize this unobtainable mind as such. 
With (A), indeed, one may tend to take the subject term “this mind” to designate 
something inside within one’s body. One may tend to delimit and reify the referent of 
the term and conceive of it as an inner object or substance, a property of which is 
                                                     
21 The following elucidation draws some ideas from Abe 1985: 11-14, though Abe’s interpretation of the 
dialogue differs from what is proposed here. 
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revealed by the predicate “unobtainable.” Even though the mind is disclosed to be 
unobtainable or bear the property of unobtainability, it remains an inner entity that is 
distinct from things outside. Plainly, no Chan master will sanction this understanding 
of the mind.22 
On the other hand, in claiming to have pacified Huike’s mind, Bodhidharma induces 
him to realize that what he is taking to be unobtainable is none other than his genuine, 
originally limpid and peaceful mind. Bodhidharma’s response is tantamount to 
expressing statement (B). Since the subject of (B) is primarily a negative adjective, one 
is less likely to project something out there or in here and delimit its existence. The 
word “unobtainable” may generate a sense of oddity and puzzlement. Yet, it may draw 
an earnest Chan practitioner’s mind to a state of emptiness wherein conceptual 
delimitation and grasping is quiescent, indeed a state of the dynamic fusion of the mind 
and the myriad objects. Such a state can present itself in an infinite number of ways. In 
the present context, it is expressed by the predicate “the mind.” As “the mind” is merely 
a predicate, instead of delimiting and reifying its referent, one may see it as indicating 
a way in which the state presents itself. Now, if one truly realizes the unobtainable state 
of emptiness, which presents itself as one’s genuine mind, one surely will experience 
peace of mind. Upon hearing his teacher’s claim, we are told, Huike immediately attains 
awakening while realizing that his mind resides neither inside nor outside, nor in the 
middle, and yet is everywhere.23 The mind to which Huike is awakened is a mind of 
no-mind. 
Although statement (B) is somewhat bizarre, it serves the purposes of evading 
                                                     
22 It is not meant that this understanding is always present whenever one expresses (A). The tendency 
may be blocked if the language user recognizes the provisionality of the words used. In normal cases, 
a Chan master would prefer (A) to (B) simply because (A) accords better with people’s conventional 
way of using language. 
23 Recorded Sayings of Master Fenyang Wude, T 47: 604a19-20. 
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conceptual delimitation and reification of one’s mind and of drawing the mind to an 
unobtainable state of emptiness. In a sense, (B) is a miniature of Chan encounter 
dialogues, which more or less serve the two functions: (i) to dislodge the interlocutor’s 
habitual way of thinking, and (ii), given appropriate conditions, to transform and open 
up the interlocutor’s mind so as to evoke in it an experience of awakening. Let us 
discuss the two functions in some detail. 
Chan tradition distinguishes live words (huoju 活句) from dead words (siju 死句) 
and recommends the use of the former. According to the Chan master Dongshan 
Shouchu 洞山守初 (910−990), if there are words within words, the (latter) words are 
dead words; if there are no words within words, the words are live words.24 Basically, 
dead words are those that induce the listener to stick to their literal meaning and 
evaluate and react to the words in light of the commonly held sense of things, which 
may generate further explanatory words. By contrast, live words are words that are 
seemingly nonsensical and run counter to our habitual way of thinking, which induces 
the listener to disregard their literal meaning and semantic function of representing 
things in the world. (Further effects of live words are explained below.) Clearly, paradox 
is a good candidate for the use of live words. When used in an encounter dialogue, such 
paradoxical expressions as “The gainer loses it,” “A rootless tree grows on a rock,” and 
“One rides a water buffalo while walking on foot” may render the interlocutor at a loss 
to make sense of their representational content. Since the expressions are not meant to 
be representational in function, none of them is contradictory in the sense of 
representing mutually contradicting states of affairs. 
                                                     
24 Recorded Sayings of Ancient Worthies, X 68: 248a10. Cf. Wright 1992: 133. The linguistic form, 
paradoxical or otherwise, of the words used may not itself determine whether the words count as live 
words. We might also need to take into account the context of using the words as well as the 
understanding of the listener. 
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In this context, consider for comparison an oft-used Chan method for dislodging 
one’s habitual way of thinking: the master holds up, or points at, something, say, a stick, 
and says to the interlocutor, “Don’t call it a stick, but tell me what it is. Quick! Quick!” 
Hearing such words, the interlocutor may be at a loss, deprived of their customary way 
of using words to designate things. Here the order “Don’t call it a stick” precludes one 
from following one’s (most) habitual way of objectifying and identifying the stick.25 
Similarly, in Chan’s use of paradoxical expression, the paradoxical sense conveyed by 
the expression prevents one from following one’s habitual way of taking the expression 
to represent the way things are. 
While paradoxical expressions in encounter dialogue are not representational, some 
of them may be intended to lead the interlocutor beyond their literal meaning to 
approximate the import that the master intends to convey but may have difficulty 
putting into words. For instance, the expression “The gainer loses it” may, apart from 
its dislodging function, also be meant to indicate that one’s original mind (the pearl!) is 
not to be realized by conceptual delimitation and grasping, which import may as well 
be indicated by the expression “The one with claws and teeth does not gain it.” Here 
we may understand indication as an indirect mode of expression: an indication 
indirectly expresses and makes known its indicated import or referent, which, for some 
reasons, cannot be properly described or represented by words. (The notion of 
indication draws on the famous Buddhist simile of a finger pointing to the moon: the 
finger points toward, or indicates, the moon but in no way represents it.) Indeed, many 
expressions, paradoxical or otherwise, in encounter dialogue are partially indicative and 
what they indicate concern chiefly the ineffable original mind or the aforesaid state of 
                                                     
25 Of course, one can think for another word to identify the object. Yet, such thinking may instantly 
arouse the master’s shouting or hitting. 
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emptiness.26 In any case, the key point for us is that, when construed indicatively, such 
expressions as “The gainer loses it” do not involve any contradiction. 
The dislodging function of an encounter dialogue is only preliminary; it paves the 
way for the other function, which is to transform and open up the interlocutor’s mind 
so as to evoke in it an experience of awakening in which one realizes the dynamic fusion 
between one’s mind and the myriad objects. Here it must be said beforehand that, for 
those of us, myself included, who have never had any experience of what it is like to 
attain Chan awakening, it is difficult to understand how the dialogue or its live words 
can have such a transformative or evocative force. Consequently, my explanation 
cannot but be brief and conjectural. 
Common people tend to take their mind to be an inner entity that is distinct from 
external objects. They also take a stick to be an external object distinct from the mind. 
The customary use of such distinct words as “mind” and “stick” to designate their 
referents reinforces the latter’s delimitation. Now, a dialogue that embodies statement 
(B) may help to prevent one from internalizing the mind and demarcating it from its 
objects. The above Chan method may help to prevent one from externalizing the stick 
and demarcating it from the mind. In particular, Chan’s emphasis on no-mind, the 
emptiness of all things, and nonattachment, as well as an encounter dialogue’s 
dislodging function, may play a role here. All these, together with proper meditation 
practice, may help a practitioner, on hearing the master’s live words, to overturn the 
cognitive chasm between the mind and its objects such that they come to experience a 
dynamic subject-object fusion. One is then awakened to one’s original mind, which 
pervades all things yet abides in none. Of course, some live words are paradoxical in 
                                                     
26 An indication is broadly cognitive as it is meant to refer indirectly to, and intimate something about, 
a reality while denying any correspondence between it and the reality. By “partially” is here meant that 
a Chan expression can be both indicative and remedial or evocative. 
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form. 
When a Chan master’s utterance functions to transform the interlocutor’s mind and 
evoke therein an experience of awakening, we may say that the master performs a 
perlocutionary speech act that produces in the interlocutor’s mind a specific mental 
effect.27 That is, apart from conveying its literal meaning and, possibly, indicated 
import, the utterance also brings about the effect of transforming the interlocutor’s mind 
such that they come to experience that which previously transcends their experience. 
Here, the expression uttered may be said to be evocative in function as it is intended to 
call forth the awakening experience of realizing one’s original mind and seeing the 
world in a refreshingly nondual way. Evocation is a noncognitive, nonreferential mode 
of expression, so it is inadequate to speak of truth, falsity, and contradictoriness in 
respect of evocative sentences. One can only speak of efficacy and inefficacy in respect 
of them. 
The arising of an awakening experience requires that one abandon one’s deep-rooted 
cognitive habit of demarcating one’s mind from its objects. When the experience arises, 
the fundamental subject-object boundary collapses, and the awakened practitioner finds 
it hard to fit the new experience into our ordinary conceptual grids. As the boundary 
collapses, all things become paradoxically both one and many, same and different.28 It 
                                                     
27 See Fung 2008: 236-242. Fung’s ideas draw on Davidson 1978. I do not find convincing Davidson’s 
view that a metaphor carries no message other than its literal meaning. However, I agree with Fung 
that a Chan master’s utterance can produce a perlocutionary effect on the interlocutor’s mind. 
28  Remarking on the renowned Chan discourse about seeing mountains as mountains and seeing 
mountains not as mountains, Abe (1985: 18) writes: “Thus in the Zen Awakening attained by Wei-hsin, 
on the one hand, mountains are really mountains in themselves, waters are really waters in themselves 
– that is, everything in the world is real in itself; and yet, on the other hand, there is no hindrance 
between any one thing and any other thing – everything is equal, interchangeable, and interfusing. 
Thus we may say: ‘Mountains are waters, waters are mountains.’ It is here in this Awakening … that 
Zen says, ‘A bridge flows, whereas water does not flow’ …” 
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is then natural for the awakened to resort to paradoxical expressions to express their 
awakening experience or whatever is considered ultimate in Chan. The expressions may 
also indicate figuratively their indirect referents’ linguistic indeterminability. Consider, 
for example, the following dialogues: 
 
Question: “What is the truth of reality?” 
Answer: “A rootless tree grows on a rock.” 
 
Question: “The myriad things return to one. Where does the one return to?” 
Answer: “One faces south to see the Northern Dipper.” 
 
Question: “What is it like for one to come to life from within death?” 
Answer: “One is not allowed to walk in night but must arrive at dawn.” 
 
Significantly, here we cannot conclude that Chan masters take certain contradictory 
expressions to be true, and that, for them, the nature of reality is contradictory in the 
sense that it is such as to render those expressions true. The paradoxicality of the 
masters’ words is due largely to the content of the awakening experience, which is 
impossible for language to adequately categorize and determine. Insofar as one, in 
undergoing the experience, feels a strong sense of oneness with an object, it makes 
sense to say oneself and the object are the same. Insofar as one’s body and the object 
are different in experienced form and location, it is also correct to say oneself and the 
object are not the same. Since the two sayings draw on different perspectives, they do 
not together violate the law of noncontradiction to the effect that nothing can be both P 
and not-P in the same way at the same time. In addition, for Chan, the linguistic 
indeterminability concerned betokens the deficiency of language and thought in 
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capturing the way things really are. By contrast, the view that certain contradictory 
expressions of reality are true appears to assign to reality a determinate, albeit 
contradictory, nature that can be precisely captured by language. 
Before ending this section, we may briefly mention yet another dimension of Chan’s 
use of language. In numerous cases, a Chan master’s utterance arises instantly and 
spontaneously from their experience of the immediate situation around them. For 
instance, a master was once asked about the first patriarch’s intention in coming from 
the West, as he was washing his feet, he then answered, “To wash this old monk’s feet.” 
In cases like this, it is futile to look for any hidden message. This helps to explain why 
in many cases the master’s words in encounter dialogue seem irrelevant to the 
interlocutor’s question.29 
In this section, we have discussed several key linguistic functions and dimensions of 
Chan encounter dialogues. The master’s words as live words are not representational in 
function: they are not meant to represent the way things are. Then, even if a master says 
in an encounter dialogue that “x is P and not-P,” the master is very unlikely to affirm 
the expression as true in the sense of truly representing reality. In some cases, the 
expression uttered, paradoxical or otherwise, is evocative, yet it is inadequate to speak 
of contradictoriness in respect of evocative expressions. In some other cases, the 
expression is indicative in function, and this recognition, as we saw above, may 
conduce to resolving literal contradiction. 
 
IV. 
In this chapter, we have investigated the presence of paradoxical language in Chinese 
                                                     
29 Cheng (1973) proposed two principles to explain the significance and logical dissolvability of Chan 
puzzles and paradoxes: the principle of ontic non-commitment and the principle of contextual 
demonstration. Some of my ideas in this section may resemble the two principles. 
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Chan Buddhism, explored the rationales for the use of paradox, and discussed whether 
Chan masters would affirm the truth of contradictory statements. As Chan is a long 
tradition that consists of various sects, lineages, texts and individuals, there remains 
much work to be done in this regard. However, our study has suggested that, in Tang 
Chan masters’ sermons and post-Tang encounter dialogues in general, the use of 
paradox does not violate the logical law of noncontradiction to the effect that nothing 
can be both P and not-P in the same way at the same time. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest focus 
mainly on Indian Madhyamaka and Japanese Zen in their argument for the thesis that 
certain Mahayana Buddhists are committed to the view that some contradictions are 
true. Given that Japanese Zen developed out of Chinese Chan, let us consider a passage 
from the Zen master Dōgen (1200−1253) that they cite in support of their thesis:30 
 
Just understand that birth-and-death is itself nirvana. There is nothing such as birth and death 
to be avoided. There is nothing such as nirvana to be sought. Only when you realise this are 
you free from birth and death. 
 
The last sentence of this passage hints at the general Buddhist view that to attain nirvana 
is to be free from life and death (birth-and-death), which in turn entails that nirvana and 
life and death are different. Yet, the first sentence states to the effect that nirvana and 
life and death are not different. In addition, the passage seems to imply contradictorily 
that there both is and is not nirvana. 
Now, we saw above that Huangbo, on account of the all-inclusiveness of original 
                                                     
30 Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest 2008: 396. I shall only discuss this passage from the Chinese Chan 
perspective. 
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mind and the mind’s sameness with nirvana, claims that life-and-death and nirvana are 
the same. He can readily claim them to be different on the ground that nirvana alone, 
but not life and death, entails genuine realization of original mind as well as freedom 
from life and death. These two claims are made from different perspectives. Meanwhile, 
the emptiness of all things indicates that there is no nirvana to be sought, though this 
does not mean the latter’s nonexistence. In addition, to seek for nirvana qua original 
mind is to conceptually objectify the mind, which is least effective for the realization 
of nirvana. Thus, there is no nirvana to be sought yet there is nirvana to be realized. It 
should be evident from this analysis that, for Chan, the above passage does not involve 
any real contradiction. 
Many factors, we have seen, contribute to Chan’s characteristic paradoxical way of 
speaking, and we must not be led by the surface grammar of expressions into supposing 
the presence of contradiction therein. As we consider language’s abundant wealth of 
meaning and the various ways in which words can be used, we may refrain from making 
the supposition and learn to appreciate Chan’s atypical but skillful use of language.31 
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